IN THE UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE

DOCKET NO.: **FR919990110US1**

IN RE APPLICATION OF: §
§
OLIVIER DAUDE §   EXAMINER: **CHRISTIAN A. LA FORGIA**
§
SERIAL NO.:   **09/696,518** §   ART UNIT: **2131**
§
FILED: **OCTOBER 25, 2000** §
§
FOR: **M/S FOR PREVENTING** §
UNAUTHORIZED SERVER §
INTERFERENCE IN AN INTERNET
PROTOCOL NETWORK §

REPLY BRIEF UNDER 37 C.F.R. 41.41

Mail Stop Briefs - Patents
Commissioner for Patents
Washington, D.C. 20231

Sir:

        This Reply Brief is submitted in response to Examiner's Answer dated June 23, 2006. No fee is believed to be required to submit this Reply Brief. No extension of time is believed to be necessary. However, in the event an extension of time is required, that extension of time is hereby requested. Please charge any fee associated with an extension of time as well as any other fee necessary to further the prosecution of this application to **IBM CORPORATION'S Deposit Account No. 09-0457.**

REMARKS

In the **Response to Argument**, on page 4, the Examiner's Answer traverses Appellants' position that "Authentication of DHCP Messages" to Droms et al. (hereinafter *Droms*), fails to disclose "detecting an unauthorized dynamic host configuration server ... in accordance with server identification data within the configuration offer messages." Supporting this traversal, the Answer describes the shared-token approach of "Protocol 0" with no discussion of the manner in which "server identification data" is used in the authentication process. The Answer also alludes to "Protocol 1," explaining "... the server replies with a DHCPOFFER message that includes authentication information, including entity authentication information." Appellants agree that both *Droms's* Protocol 0 and Protocol 1 utilize authentication information in the offer message to authenticate or "authorize" the server. Appellants urge, however, that the "server identification data" feature expressly added by Amendment, while arguably a subset of, is clearly not an equivalent in scope to, "authentication data" in general. Information used to authorize or authenticate *may or may not* include information that identifies an entity. *Droms's* disclosure makes it clear that neither Protocol 0 nor Protocol 1 utilize server identification data for authentication purposes. "Protocol 1" uses an encrypted message authentication code and not server identification data to authenticate the server as well as authenticating the message. (See *Droms* paragraph 4, page 4, explaining, "... the client requests authentication in its DHCPDISCOVER message and the server replies with a DHCPOFFER message that includes authentication information. This authentication information contains an encrypted value generated by the source as a message authentication code (MAC) to provide message authentication and entity authentication." (Emphasis added). "Protocol 0" depicted in section 3, pg. 3- pg. 4, utilizes an "opaque, unencoded" authentication token that is known (i.e. pre-specified) to both the client and server and that provides mutual authentication. *Droms's* disclosure provides no indication that the token contains data that identifies either the client or server.

In Amendment A, Appellants specified "server identification data" as the particular type of data used to authorize the DHCP server consistent with the aim of the invention to provide a one-sided checker client functionality that can be plugged into a DHCP system without having to alter the legacy DHCP system. Appellants' use of server identification data is in contrast to the

authentication data used in both *Droms's* Protocol 0 and Protocol 1 that each require two-sided (client and server) compatibility.

With continued reference to the "server identification data" feature, Appellants agree that prior art DHCPOFFER messages may include data, such as an IP address, that may be reasonably interpreted as "server identification data." Appellants contend, however, that the inclusion of server identification data in the DHCPOFFER message does not compel a conclusion that said server identification data is in fact utilized for server authentication. An example of a non-authentication use of the IP address is that it may be used to provide the recipient client the means to establish communications with the offering server. As explained above, *Droms's* disclosure indicates that neither the "Protocol 0" nor the "Protocol 1" technique utilizes an IP address or any other server identification data to authenticate the offering server.

Relating to the same claim element, the Examiner's Answer mischaracterizes Appellants' contentions relating to the rejections of the claims. Specifically, the Answer asserts that Appellants' arguments rely on the server identification data being an IP address. In fact, Appellants undertake no such reliance and instead, referring to page 7 of the Appeal Brief, allude to the support in the Specification providing an exemplary characterization of "server identification data," which must be construed most broadly consistent with the Specification. The Answer points out that the prior art references disclose that DHCP messages includes the sender's IP address. Appellants agree that supplying server identification data, in the form of an IP address or otherwise, is known and inherent in disclosures relating to DHCP messages as well as most other IP traffic. However, Appellants again urge that the presence of server identification data in a DHCP offer message does not compel an inference that this data is utilized in any particular authentication routine such as the "Protocol 0" or "Protocol 1" routines disclosed by *Droms*.

On page 5, the Examiner's Answer again mischaracterizes Appellants' contentions regarding the claim elements, asserting Appellants rely on a "server checker client" not mentioned in the claim language, and implying that Appellants have improperly limited such a client to being hardware rather than a program. Appellants have undertaken no unwarranted reliance nor have limited the meaning of "server checker client" to hardware rather than program instructions. Appellants do not rely on the label "server checker client" per se. Instead, and as

clearly explained on page 8 of the Appeal Brief, the functional characterization imputed to the "server checker client" (described broadly therein by Appellants as a "logical entity") is required by the <u>claim language</u>. Namely, the logical entity, referred to as the "server checker client," that unicasts configurations requests to disable the detected unauthorized DHC server from responding to configuration requests from network clients is the same client (logically but not necessarily physically distinct) that performs the broadcasting, receiving, and detecting steps as expressly <u>required</u> by the preceding claim elements. The characterization of the server checker client as the logical entity that performs the broadcasting, receiving, and detecting steps is a substantive and significant characterization of the "unicasting" step given that, Appellants invention is designed to employ a logically (and possibly physically) discrete server checker client such that the legacy DHCP network components and protocols may remain unchanged.

While claims terms must be given their broadest reasonable interpretation consistent with the specification, the Answer's definition of "server checker client" as being "merely a program running on a workstation" improperly deviates from the express and unambiguous claim language itself.

The fourth element of Claim 1 (and similarly for Claims 14 and 27) recites, in part, "responsive to said detecting step, unicasting host configuration requests from said server checker client to said unauthorized dynamic configuration server..." In addition to the foregoing misinterpretation of the server checker client as meaning *any* client or workstation, on pages 5 and 6, the Answer fails to properly address at least two key limitations in this element. First, Appellants have repeatedly urged that the express limitation that the unicasting step be performed <u>in response to detecting the unauthorized DHC server</u> is a key feature that is absent from any of the cited references either individually or in combination.

On page 5, the Answer correctly explains that U.S. Pat. No. 5,884,024, issued to Lim (hereinafter *Lim*) discloses, at col. 2, lines 27-34, a single client obtaining IP address leases from a DHCP server. Appellants note that Lim describes the phenomenon as address "hogging" and explains the problem from the perspective of the other clients which are unable to timely receive the presumptively valid address from the presumptively valid DHCP server. Nothing in the foregoing passage or anywhere else in *Lim* indicates that the DHCP server has been detected as being "unauthorized" as expressly required by Appellants' claim language.

Regarding the issue of suggestion to combine the references, on page 6, the Answer further incorrectly asserts that *Lim* states that by a single client obtaining all IP address leases from a DHCP server, other clients are blocked from access to the IP addresses, <u>thereby preventing clients from receiving false configuration information and becoming victims of denial of service or man in the middle attacks</u>. Again, *Lim* describes an "IP address hogging attack" by one client against one or more other clients and does not state anything about any potentially beneficial ramification, whether it be silencing an unauthorized server or otherwise, of such an "attack." Rather than teaching unicasting configuration requests to "silence" an unauthorized server, *Lim's* non-express but arguably inherent disclosure of unicasting host configuration requests to a server covers only the incidental and contextually undesired disabling of an authorized DHCP server resulting from the IP address hogging. The disclosure of *Droms* is limited to authentication/authorization and contains no disclosure or suggestion whatsoever relating to any method for disabling a server found to be unauthorized. Neither *Droms* nor *Lim*, individually or in combination, relate to deliberately disabling DHCP servers and therefore neither provides a suggestion or motivation to combine what is described as a client-to-client attack by *Lim* as a response to detecting a non-authenticated DHCP server as shown in *Droms*.

The second limitation of the foregoing unicasting element not properly addressed by the Answer again relates to the characterization of the "server checker client" as being the same logical entity that performs the broadcasting, receiving, and detecting steps as explained above.

On page 6, the Answer appears to shift the grounds for rejecting claims 8, 21, and 34 from *Droms* to disclosure by *Lim*, and incorrectly asserts that Appellants' arguments for overcoming the prior art rely on the absence of disclosure of a "server table." The Claim element in question recites, in part, "wherein said checker client includes a server table having a list of authorized dynamic host configuration servers, and wherein said step of detecting an unauthorized dynamic host configuration server further comprises comparing a server identifier included in each configuration offer message with authorized server identification data in the server table." Appellants agree that in FIG. 6 and col. 6, line 55 through col. 7, line 20, *Lim* discloses a trusted identifier database 318. Appellants note, however, that database 318 does not maintain any list of authorized DHCP servers. Instead, as explained at col. 6, lines 2-6, col. 7, lines 9-14 and lines 31-39, the "trusted identifiers" maintained by database 318 are data objects that identify a relay agent (e.g. cable modems) associated with a single client system. Appellants

further note that none of the references, either individually or in any combination, disclose "comparing a server identifier included in each configuration offer message with authorized server identification data in the server table" to detect an unauthorized server.

Appellants have clearly shown that the combination of *Daizo*, *Droms*, and *Lim* neither contemplates nor suggests the proposed invention recited in Appellants' claims, and for those reasons, Examiner's rejection of Appellants' claims is not well founded and should be reversed.

CONCLUSION

Appellants have again pointed out with specificity the manifest error in the Examiner's rejections, and the claim language which renders the invention patentable over the reference. Appellants, therefore, respectfully request that the present rejections be reversed.

Respectfully submitted,

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